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Lewis Kurlantzick* & B.J. Pivonka† 
National Basketball Association (NBA) Commissioner David 
Stern’s controversial “veto” in December 2011 of the trade that 
would have sent Chris Paul from the New Orleans Hornets to the 
Los Angeles Lakers raises fundamental conflict-of-interest issues.  
These issues are rooted in the league’s ownership of the Hornets 
franchise, and the resulting multiple roles played by the league’s 
chief executive.  More precisely, this situation puts at risk the 
commissioner’s neutrality—his commitment not to favor one team 
over another.  Though perhaps unsurprising because of the rarity of 
a league owning a team, what is striking in the NBA—and in Major 
League Baseball and the National Hockey League as well—is the 
apparent absence of attention to the problem and the lack of a 
structural or informal response that both recognizes and looks to 
limit the potential conflict of interest. 
                                                                                                             
1 A different version of this Article appeared in 2 ENT. ARTS & SPORTS L.J. (Summer 
2013). 
*  Zephaniah Swift Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.  I wish 
to thank Robert Cane for invaluable research assistance. 
†  J.D. 2012, University of Connecticut School of Law; MBA 2008, Salve Regina 
University; B.A. 2008, Salve Regina University. 
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Moreover, the reaction of league owners to the Chris Paul 
episode points to a broader matter: the existence of a collective 
interest in the personnel exchanges between individual franchises 
and the manner in which that collective interest might be 
expressed.  In this Article, we address the conflict-of-interest 
issues.  In a postscript, we comment on the collective league 
interest in personnel exchanges. 
I. THE TALE OF LEAGUE OWNERSHIP AND THE CHRIS PAUL TRADE 
The New Orleans Hornets were a team in serious financial 
distress in 2010.  For a number of years the team ranked among the 
lowest in attendance in the NBA.2  In addition, ownership was at or 
near its maximum credit limit.  And the team’s recent financial 
history was marked by negative cash flows, recurring operational 
losses, and partner deficits.3 
That the Hornets’ economic woes caused concern for the league 
and ultimately led to the acquisition of the franchise in December 
20104 is unsurprising since the fortunes of the member franchises 
are linked.5  After all, the financial distress of a member club can 
                                                                                                             
2 See NBA Attendance Report—2010, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nba/attendance/_/y
ear/2010 (last visited Apr. 7, 2014) (the Hornets changed their name to the Pelicans in 
2013). 
3 See Tommy Craggs, The New Orleans Hornets’ Sad Financial Documents, DEADSPIN 
(Dec. 7, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://deadspin.com/5708313/the-new-orleans-hornets
-sad-financial-documents. 
4 The league purchased 100% of the team.  The NBA’s objective was to quickly 
identify a buyer for the team (and hopefully turn a profit).  However, it took a year and a 
half before the sale of the Hornets. See Saints Owner Agrees to Buy Hornets, ESPN (Apr. 
14, 2012, 1:19 PM), http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/7809655/new-orleans-saints-
owner-tom-benson-agrees-buy-new-orleans-hornets. 
5 See Larry Coon, 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement, Question 24: How Does 
Revenue Sharing Work? How Is It Different from the Luxury Tax?, NBA SALARY CAP 
FAQ, http://www.cbafaq.com/salarycap.htm#Q24 (last updated Jan. 15, 2014).  Similar 
concern for the protection of asset values and the maintenance of stability led to the league 
purchases of the Phoenix Coyotes in the NHL and the Montreal Expos in MLB. See Barry 
M. Bloom, MLB Selects D.C. for Expos, MLB (Sept. 29, 2004), 
http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20040929&content_id=875100&vkey=news_
mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=null; NHL Submits Bid to Buy Coyotes out of Bankruptcy, NHL 
(Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=487025.  Leagues have taken 
steps short of ownership with respect to distressed franchises, such as the Buffalo Sabres, 
Ottawa Senators, and Dallas Stars in hockey and the Texas Rangers and Los Angeles 
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lead to disruption of the team’s business as the owner seeks a 
solution to his financial problems.  A distress sale of a team may 
lower the perceived value of other teams.6  Moreover, involvement 
of a bankruptcy court can limit the league’s ability to control the 
eventual disposition and new ownership of the team.7 
In December 2011 the league-owned Hornets were looking to 
trade its star guard, Chris Paul.  Under the terms of a three-team, 
six-player deal, Paul would have moved to the Los Angeles 
Lakers.  In exchange, the Lakers would have sent Pau Gasol to the 
Houston Rockets and Lamar Odom to the Hornets.  New Orleans 
also would have received Rockets’ guards Kevin Martin and Goran 
Dragic and forward Luis Scola.  In addition, the Hornets would 
have received the New York Knicks’ first-round draft pick in 2012, 
which the Rockets had acquired in a previous trade.8 
                                                                                                             
Dodgers in baseball.  In these situations the leagues exerted varying levels of control over 
operations while they sorted out disputes with creditors and shopped for new owners. See 
Richard Sandomir, Examples of How Clippers Could Benefit from League Takeover, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 7, 2014, at B14; Bill Shaikin, Nine of 30 Teams Reportedly in Violation of 
MLB Debt Service Rules, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011
/jun/02/sports/la-sp-0603-baseball-debt-20110603; see also Damien Cox, NHL: Absence 
of Franchise Woes a New Reality for Commissioner Gary Bettman, STAR (Dec. 17, 2013, 
7:29 AM), http://www.thestar.com/sports/the_spin/ 2013/12/absence_of_franchise_woes
_a_new_reality_for_bettman.html.  Interestingly, in 1935 the Boston Braves franchise 
was forfeited to the National League because of the club’s failure to fulfill its contractual 
obligations over an extended period of time.  While the league was prepared to appoint a 
general manager and operate the team, within two weeks controlling interest in the club 
was sold to a former Red Sox and Dodgers executive. See John Drebinger, National 
League Takes over Affairs of Braves at Meeting of Club Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 
1935, at 25; Michael Bates, Random Thursday: The 1936 Bees and the 2011 Dodgers, 
PLATOON ADVANTAGE (Apr. 21, 2011, 3:27 PM), http://platoonadvantage.com/
2011-articles/random-thursday-the-1936-bees-and-the-2011-dodgers.html. 
6 Cf. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 548 (7th Cir. 1986) (determining the 
fair market value of an NBA franchise by looking at the recent sales prices of comparable 
franchises; therefore, a depressed sale price would negatively affect the valuations for the 
rest of the league). 
7 See, e.g., In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, L.L.C., 414 B.R. 577 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009) 
(Phoenix Coyotes bankruptcy proceeding) (rejecting a bid by the NHL to purchase a team 
in bankruptcy); David Wharton & Bill Shaikin, Bankruptcy Filing Changes the Playing 
Field for Frank McCourt’s Struggle with Major League Baseball, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 
2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/29/sports/la-sp-dodgers-mccourt-bankruptcy-
20110630. 
8 Howard Beck, N.B.A Rejects Trade Sending Paul to Lakers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/sports/basketball/paul-set-to-join-lakers-as-
part-of-3-team-deal.html?_r=0. 
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The deal appeared to be an equitable one for New Orleans, 
particularly since Dell Demps, the Hornets’ General Manager, had 
little leverage with possible trade partners as Paul was able to opt 
out of his contract in the summer of 2012 and had informed the 
Hornets that he intended to leave.9   The exchange would have 
yielded the team a generous package of talent.  Martin was among 
the top scorers in the league; Odom was “a versatile big man”10 who 
had been named the Sixth Man of the Year in 2010–11; and Scola 
was a “skilled and rugged power forward.”11  The terms of the 
exchange surely did not suggest any abnormality in the process nor 
did they differ in some obvious way from Demps’ prior transactions 
with which the league did not interfere.12  Nor could one argue that 
Stern had greater knowledge about league personnel than Demps, as 
it is Demps’ full-time job to deal in such matters. 
Dan Gilbert, the owner of the Cleveland Cavaliers, though, 
deemed the trade a “travesty” and reportedly expressed his 
disapproval to Stern: “I just don’t see how we can allow this trade to 
happen.  I know the vast majority of owners feel the same way that I 
do.  When will we just change the name of 25 of the 30 teams to the 
Washington Generals?” 13   Apparently, a number of other 
                                                                                                             
9 See id. 
10 Dave McMenamin, Laker’s Lamar Odom Top Sixth Man, ESPN (Apr. 20, 2011, 9:25 
AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/los-angeles/nba/news/story?id=6389586. 
11 Beck, supra note 8. 
12 From October 23, 2010 to December 9, 2011, the New Orleans Hornets (now known 
as the Pelicans) acquired five players by trade and twelve players by signing. See New 
Orleans Hornets Transactions, REALGM BASKETBALL, http://basketball.realgm.com
/nba/teams/New_Orleans_Hornets/19/Transaction_History (last visited May 31, 2014).  
Apparently, in none of these cases did the league office, as owner, intervene in any way 
with respect to a trade or signing or treat the actions as “franchise-altering decisions” 
which required the exercise of review authority over the general manager’s judgments. See 
David Aldridge, Free Agency’s Frantic Start Sets Tone for Coaches, Teams, NBA (Dec. 
12, 2011 1:13 PM), http://www.nba.com/2011/news/features/david_aldridge/12/12/free-
agency-tests-teams/index.html  
13 Mike Bresnahan & Broderick Turner, Lakers’ Deal for Chris Paul Is a No-go, the 
NBA Rules, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/08/
sports/la-sp-lakers-paul-20111209.  There is good reason to believe that Gilbert was as 
much concerned about the impact of the trade in reducing the Lakers’ luxury tax liability, 
and therefore decreasing the Cavaliers’ luxury tax receipts, as about competitive balance 
within the league.  Under the CBA, luxury-tax revenues are divided among 
non-tax-paying teams, such as Cleveland, with lower payrolls. See Coon, Question 22: 
Where Does the Escrow and Luxury Tax Money Go?, supra note 5.  Had the Paul trade 
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small-market owners registered similar concerns with the 
commissioner about the move of another star to a big-market 
team.14  In explaining the decision to block the trade, Stern insisted 
that the communications from small-market owners had no effect on 
his judgment.15  He stated: 
Since the NBA purchased the New Orleans Hornets, 
final responsibility for significant management 
decisions lies with the commissioner’s office in 
consultation with team chairman Jac Sperling.  All 
decisions are made on the basis of what is in the best 
interests of the Hornets.  In the case of the trade 
proposal that was made to the Hornets for Chris Paul, 
                                                                                                             
been consummated, the Lakers would have cut payroll while also acquiring a star 
guard.  Los Angeles would have “shed $41 million in salary and luxury taxes in two 
seasons if the trade had been approved.” Mark Medina, NBA’s Rejection of Chris Paul 
Trade Hurt Lakers in Several Ways, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2012, http://articles.la
times.com/2012/may/31/sports/la-sp-ln-la-nbas-rejection-of-chris-paul-trade-hurt-lakers-i
n-several-ways-20120531.  Gilbert’s effort to use his position as part-owner of the 
Hornets to urge Stern to exercise his power as the Hornets’ fiduciary to make a ruling that 
would benefit the Cavaliers presents an obvious conflict of interest. See Larry Coon, Dan 
Gilbert’s Letter Misses the Mark, ESPN (Dec. 9, 2011), http://espn.go.com/nba/
story/_/id/7336526/nba-critique-dan-gilbert-letter.  The article argues that “Gilberts’s 
logic was as flimsy as his motives were suspect.” Id.  The article goes on to suggest that 
the Hornets were the least of Gilbert’s concern because he instead complained about “the 
Lakers receiving the best player in the trade while saving money, not giving up any draft 
picks, and receiving a large trade exception to boot.” Id.  Finally, the article argues that the 
luxury-tax system “is supposed to decrease spending, yet owners like Gilbert depend on 
teams like the Lakers continuing to spend like they used to . . . .” Id. 
14 See Bresnahan & Turner, supra note 13.  Apparently, these owners were particularly 
upset because they believed that a prime objective of the recent labor lockout was to limit 
the ability of large-market teams to leverage small-market teams for star players pending 
free agency. See Chris Broussard & Marc Stein, Sources: Teams Revisit Chris Paul Deal, 
ESPN, http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/nba/story/_/id/7336597/ teams-chris-paul-trade-
hopeful-revival-sources-say (last updated Dec. 10, 2011, 4:19 PM) (quoting Dallas 
Mavericks owner Mark Cuban as saying that “[t]here’s a reason that we went through this 
lockout, and one of the reasons is to give small-market teams the ability to keep their stars 
and the ability to compete”); Michael Jordan Opposed Chris Paul Deal, ESPN, 
http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/7354177/charlotte-bobcats-michael- 
jordan-opposed-chris-paul-los-angeles-lakers-trade (last updated Dec. 14, 2011, 9:04 PM).  
That the trade, in fact, would have been beneficial to the Lakers has been seriously 
questioned. See John Hollinger, Stern Saves Lakers From Themselves, ESPN, 
http://insider.espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/7334000/nba-lakers-better-not-making-chris-pa
ul-trade (last updated Dec. 8, 2011, 11:36 PM). 
15 For a strong argument that Stern’s insistence was suspect, see Coon, Dan Gilbert’s 
Letter Misses the Mark, supra note 13. 
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we decided, free from the influence of other NBA 
owners, that the team was better served with Chris in 
a Hornets uniform than by the outcome of the terms 
of that trade.16 
In one interpretation, the reference to Paul’s value to the Hornets 
as a player—“better served with Chris in a Hornets uniform”—was 
fatuous.  Of course, the team would prefer to have an outstanding 
player (indefinitely) as a member of the squad.  But that was not an 
available alternative since everyone knew that Paul planned to leave 
New Orleans after the 2011–12 season.17  Thus, the task for Demps 
was to make the best deal possible so as to avoid the unpleasant 
scene of an unhappy superstar playing out a lame-duck season (as 
had occurred with the Nuggets and Carmelo Anthony).  Indeed, 
Paul was traded a few days after Stern nixed the trade to the 
Lakers.18 
Whatever the stimulus that prompted the veto (and whatever one 
believes about the extent of Demps’ authority), the timing of the 
league action was, to say the least, peculiar.19  The terms of the 
                                                                                                             
16 Houston Mitchell, David Stern Explains Why He Blocked Chris Paul Trade, L.A. 
TIMES (Dec. 9, 2011, 10:31 AM), http://lakersblog.latimes.com/lakersblog/2011/
12/chris-paul-david-stern.html. 
17 Paul had made it clear that he would not sign a contract extension with New Orleans 
and instead planned to opt out of his contract and become a free agent on July 1, 
2012.  Had New Orleans kept Paul on the team till the end of season, he would have 
departed without the Hornets receiving anything in exchange for him.  The team’s possible 
alternative to such a departure would have been to negotiate a sign-and-trade deal with a 
team of Paul’s choice, in the same manner as the Phoenix Suns signed and then traded 
Amare Stoudemire in 2010. See Broussard & Stein, supra note 14. 
18 Paul was traded to the Los Angeles Clippers.  In return, the Hornets received 
shooting guard Eric Gordon, center Chris Kaman, forward Al-Farouq Aminu, and the 
Minnesota Timberwolves’ 2012 first-round draft pick.  Apparently, Stern preferred the 
Clippers’ offer because it was loaded with young players and draft picks.  Whatever the 
benefit to the Hornets, there is no doubt about the positive effects of the trade for the 
Clippers. See Lee Jenkins, Finally, It’s Hip to Be a Clip, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 30, 
2012, http://cnnsi.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1194180/index.htm. 
19 If Demps’ authority was, in fact, significantly limited and trades were subject to more 
than cursory review by Stern and Sperling, it would appear to make little sense not to have 
run the proposed trade by Sperling and the league office so as to avoid the negative fallout 
from announcement and then invalidation. See generally Jonathan Feigen, Did NBA 
Commish Lie About Failed Three-team Trade That Involved Rockets?, HOUSTON 
CHRONICLE, http://www.chron.com/sports/rockets/article/Source-NBA-commish-lied-
about-failed-three-team-2409742.php (last updated Dec. 18, 2011, 5:16 PM) (reporting on 
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three-team trade had already been publicly reported, and Stern’s 
action, therefore, produced significant fallout.20  Lamar Odom, for 
example, was so disturbed by the knowledge of his inclusion in the 
scuttled exchange that he requested that the Lakers trade him, a 
request that the team honored by sending him to Dallas in a lopsided 
deal.21  The Lakers were left fuming by the intervention and its 
effects.22  In addition to facing the task of dealing with Scola and 
Martin (the players the team just tried to trade), the center-desperate 
Houston Rockets were seriously distressed as the acquisition of Pau 
Gasol was apparently part of a broader plan to sign free-agent Nene 
Hilario; this gave the team one of the better front lines in the 
league. 23   Indeed, Les Alexander, the Rockets’ owner, remains 
personally bitter with Stern.24  Dell Demps supposedly considered 
resigning from his job, and had to be talked out of a resignation.25 
While we have no hard evidence, it is difficult not to suspect that 
the Clippers’ change of position—whereby the team exhibited 
willingness to give up players whom it previously had adamantly 
                                                                                                             
confidential sources who claimed that David Stern’s statement that the trade he nixed was 
never considered a done deal is not true). 
20 The players’ union and Chris Paul expressed dissatisfaction with Stern’s 
pronouncement and suggested possible legal action in response.  But they never indicated 
what the legal grounds for their challenge would be. See Kurt Helin, Chris Paul Reportedly 
Considering Legal Action Against League, NBC SPORTS (Dec. 9, 2011, 2:19 AM), 
http://probasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/12/09/chris-paul-reportedly-consid
ering-legal-action-against-league (detailing how Chris Paul considered legal action against 
Stern, possibly in the form of damages for restraint of trade and lost wages). 
21 See Dave McMenamin, Lamar Odom Dealt to Dallas, ESPN (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:02 
PM), http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/nba/story/_/id/7341952/los-angeles-lakers-lamar-
odom-dealt-dallas-mavericks-asking-trade. 
22 See John Friel, Lakers Rumors: Los Angeles Front Office Upset with Clippers Chris 
Paul Trade, BLEACHER REPORT (Dec. 15, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
984279-lakers-rumors-los-angeles-front-office-upset-with-clippers-chris-paul-trade. 
23 See Ken Berger, Lakers Pull out of Paul Talks, CBS SPORTS, http://www.cbs
sports.com/mcc/blogs/entry/11838893/33792495/3 (last updated Dec. 11, 2011 2:36 AM). 
24 See Feigen, supra note 19. 
25 See Adrian Wojnarowski, Teams Still Pushing for Paul Trade, YAHOO! SPORTS (Dec. 
9, 2011, 11:50 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news?slug=aw-wojnarowski_chris_
paul_lakers_hornets_nba_120811.  Officials involved in the trade talks said that there was 
never an indication from the league office, which was consulted during the negotiations, 
that Demps did not have authority to make a deal.  “[S]everal teams negotiating with New 
Orleans to get Paul asked the league office and were told Demps had full authority to 
execute a trade.” Id.  The investment made by the teams negotiating the deal is consistent 
with such an assumption about Demps’ authority. 
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resisted including in the trade—reflected, at least in part, a concern 
about the possibility of future payback by the commissioner in light 
of the importance of the central league office.  After all, the result 
of Stern’s scuttling of the trade to the Lakers was that the Hornets 
had less leverage.  The Lakers were one of a few teams with which 
Paul would entertain staying for the long term, and the Hornets were 
essentially told that they could not deal with the Lakers.26  Thus, the 
Lakers were not present to drive up the bid for Paul.27 
Notably, Chris Paul desired to exit New Orleans despite the fact 
that the Hornets could offer him a longer and larger 
contract. 28   Indeed, the new collective bargaining agreement 
contains a number of provisions that permit an existing team to offer 
a more generous financial package than a new team and, therefore, 
makes free agency less attractive.29  The end result of the scenario, 
which still reflected Paul’s leverage as a soon-to-be unrestricted free 
agent does not make owners such as Gilbert and Jordan much 
happier.30  To a considerable extent, the complaints of owners such 
                                                                                                             
26 See J.A. Adande, Leave It to NBA to Undercut Own Team, ESPN (Dec. 8, 2011), 
http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/page/cp3dealhold-111208/quashing-cp3-deal-shows-nba-l
east-bright. 
27 See id. See generally Howard Beck, On Basketball: N.B.A. and Its Conflicts Cloud 
Getting Best Deal for Hornets, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, at B13 (noting that the Lakers 
should have been able to acquire Chris Paul, the same way Carmelo Anthony and Deron 
Williams were involved in lopsided trades, as a trade generally involves a certain amount 
of risk). 
28 See Ken Berger, CP3 Not Sure If He Would Have Left New Orleans on His Own, CBS 
SPORTS (Feb. 14, 2014, 3:55 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/nba/writer/ken-berger
/24443441/cp3-not-sure-if-he-wouldve-left-new-orleans-on-his-own. 
29 Under the present collective bargaining agreement, a team can offer its free agent a 
five-year contract with 7.5% raises.  Other teams may offer him only a four-year 
agreement with 4.5% raises. See Larry Coon, Breaking Down Changes in New CBA, ESPN 
(Nov. 28, 2011), http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/page/CBA-111128/how-new-nba-deal-
compares-last-one.  This is known as the Larry Bird exception, which also permits teams 
to exceed the salary cap to re-sign their own free agents at an amount up to the player’s 
maximum salary. See Coon, Question 25: What Are Salary Cap Extensions?, supra note 5. 
30 To the extent Commissioner Stern, in fact, was acting simply as the owner of the 
Hornets and pursuing its interests, his trade assessments would not include consideration of 
effect on competitive balance within the league, an effect about which Gilbert and other 
small-market owners expressed concern.  In fact, whether the new collective bargaining 
agreement lays a foundation for a future in which smaller-revenue teams have more 
equitable chances to compete for the biggest prize players is questionable. See Eric Shulz, 
The Effect of the New CBA on the Utah Jazz & Small Market NBA Teams, YAHOO! VOICES 
(Nov. 30, 2011), http://voices.yahoo.com/the-effect-cba-utah-jazz-small-market-105
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as Gilbert indicate a fundamental dislike for the institution of free 
agency and its expression in the present collective bargaining 
agreement.  Some owners simply disapprove of players’ 
opportunity for mobility and its consequences.31  However, as long 
as a significant measure of free agency exists, owners cannot control 
players’ desires to move to a team that includes other players with 
whom they want to play.32 
Whatever one makes of Stern’s veto and criticisms of it, amidst 
the maneuverings and explanations about Chris Paul’s employment 
destination, a central difficulty was ignored or downplayed—the 
issue of conflict of interest. 33   This conflict is one of the 
fundamental issues at hand whenever a league steps in to manage an 
individual franchise.  A conflict of interest exists when two or more 
interests of an individual seem incompatible.34  The concern is that 
the existence of a conflict of interest will tend to make the person’s 
judgment in that situation less reliable than it would normally 
                                                                                                             
65417.html (pointing out that even if a small-market team can offer a player slightly more 
money, major markets offer players significant opportunity for incremental cash from 
personal sponsorships and endorsements, and the real chance of winning a championship). 
31 See Wojnarowski, supra note 25 (noting that several owners, and even David Stern, 
do not like that players are essentially able to dictate where they are traded). See also 
Bennett Corcoran, James Harden Trade: Why the CBA Accomplished Nothing, BLEACHER 
REPORT (Oct. 28, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1387503-james-harden-
trade-why-the-cba-accomplished-nothing (pointing out that the new CBA did not prevent 
James Harden from leaving a smaller market team for a larger market); Chad Ford, 
Franchise Player Tag in the NBA?, ESPN (Jan. 21, 2011),  http://espn.go.com/blog/ 
truehoop/post/_/id/24106/franchise-player/tag (noting that players like Chris Paul and 
Dwight Howard have forced their way from smaller to larger markets, and perhaps the 
institution of a “franchise tag” would fix this situation). 
32 See Henry Abbott, Chapter 1: The Family, ESPN (July 19, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/new-york/nba/story/_/id/8180308/nba-jeremy-lin-six-degrees-separati
on-family (mentioning that the most publicized, contemporary example of this behavior 
was the 2010 decision by Lebron James, Chris Bosh, and Dwyane Wade to move to, or 
remain with, the Miami Heat, agreeing to play for less than they could have made 
elsewhere). 
33 See Russell Scibetti, Updated: Leagues as Team Owners and Operators, BUSINESS OF 
SPORTS (Dec. 9, 2011, 9:08 AM), http://www.thebusinessofsports.com/2011/12/
09/updated-leagues-as-team-owners-and-operators (noting that this is not only an NBA 
issue, but has existed in the MLB with the Texas Rangers and Los Angeles Dodgers). 
34 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining a conflict of interest as a 
“real or seeming incompatibility between one’s private interests and one’s public or 
fiduciary duties” in the context of attorney–client relations). 
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be.35  Here, the conflict runs in two directions.  The team may be 
operated to serve the interests of the league,36 and the league may 
be operated to benefit the team.37  A striking example of a situation 
that raises the second type of tension is when a team files a 
tampering charge against another team.  Such a charge alleges that 
the second team has had impermissible contact with a player on the 
first team.38  Indeed, to underline the point: Imagine New Orleans 
had filed a charge against another franchise—the Lakers, for 
example—claiming that the other franchise had tampered with 
Chris Paul.  In such a scenario, the commissioner would not only be 
wearing multiple hats as owner of the Hornets and adjudicator of 
claims alleging violation of league rules, but his decision would 
likely raise suspicion that these conflicting interests affected his 
judgment.  It is to avoid such suspicion that judicial codes of ethics 
require a judge to excuse himself from decisions in similar 
situations.39  Similarly, a failure by the commissioner to avoid or 
respond to the conflict would bespeak a lack of attention to or 
                                                                                                             
35 See Michael Davis, Introduction, in CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PROFESSIONS 6–11 
(Michael Davis & Andrew Stark eds., 2001). 
36 See Roy Blount, Jr., Plight of the Humblebees, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 20, 2012, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1194899/index.htm (“A 
league owning a team is like a country owning one of its political parties.  Unless the 
owner wants to crush all the other teams, neither the team nor its fans will ever believe the 
owner has their interests at heart.  Does anyone ever root wholeheartedly for the general 
good?”). 
37 See, e.g., Sean McAdam, Get Ready for Another Year of Endless Expos Questions, 
ESPN (Feb. 11, 2003), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?id=1507204.  The 
article notes that MLB control over the Expos franchise led to inevitable problems.  “No 
matter what the Expos did, they—or more precisely, the remaining 29 owners—opened 
themselves to charges of conflict of interest.  When the Expos and GM Omar Minaya 
skillfully outmaneuvered other clubs for pitcher Bartolo Colon, there were cries that MLB 
had orchestrated the deal to help the Expos to win and thus, inflate the value of the 
franchise.” Id. 
38 See, e.g., Sam Amick & Jeff Zillgitt, NBA Fines Three Teams for Tampering, USA 
TODAY, June 11, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2013/06/10/nba-teams-
filing-tampering-charges/2409499 (reporting on a fine imposed on three NBA teams for 
statements made regarding players under contract to other teams who were soon to become 
free agents). 
39 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012) (disqualification of justice, judge, or 
magistrate).  The purpose of such recusal, which insures the decision-maker is free of 
disabling conflicts of interest, is to insure impartiality in the resolution of disputes, to 
protect the judiciary’s reputation, and to maintain public confidence in the fairness of the 
courts. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Keeping up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach 
to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. Kan. L. Rev. 531, 541, 551–52 (2005). 
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concern for the need to ensure impartiality in resolving disputes, to 
protect the commissioner’s reputation, and to instill confidence in 
affected parties in the fairness of the league processes.40 
While the tampering hypothetical starkly presents the conflict 
problem, there are numerous instances where a league 
commissioner exercising his typical authority would face the same 
predicament.  Think, for example, of him being called upon to 
exercise his authority to resolve a draft-related dispute, to approve a 
player trade, to sanction players, or to arbitrate a disagreement 
between a franchise and a coach.  Obviously, the league-owned 
team could be involved in any of these scenarios.  Here, the 
appropriate response is to provide for abstention by the 
commissioner and the appointment of an independent arbitrator to 
decide the matter.  That arrangement is designed to serve the 
interests in insuring impartiality and generating confidence in the 
process.41   Notably, when this kind of conflict arose in Major 
                                                                                                             
40 Interestingly, a conflict of interest is built into the structure of leagues, such as Major 
League Soccer, that are established as a centrally planned, single-entity arrangement.  Not 
only does the single-entity model undermine entrepreneurial initiative and reduce interest 
in team ownership, it also jeopardizes the integrity and therefore the marketability of the 
league’s product.  The belief that the outcome of games is determined by the merits of 
competition is central to the attraction of a league’s product, and therefore the prevention 
of conflicts of interest that might undermine this perception is imperative.  But under an 
arrangement where all teams are “consolidated under one corporate roof,” the teams would 
“act as local subsidiaries of the league-corporation.”  And consumers might well suspect 
the league owner of “influencing the rules of the game,” and the assignment of players, in 
order to maximize its profits.  “The possibility of doing so would therefore significantly 
undermine the integrity and credibility of the championship race.” See Helmut M. Dietl et 
al., Governance of Professional Sports Leagues—Cooperatives Versus Contracts 3–4 
(Inst. for Strategy & Bus. Econ., Univ. Of Zurich, Working Paper No. 59, 2007); see also 
George G. Daly, The Baseball Player’s Labor Market Revisited, in DIAMONDS ARE 
FOREVER: THE BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 11, 18 (Paul M. Sommers ed., 1992) (noting that a 
league’s legitimacy is enhanced by independent ownership of teams and damaged by 
ownership integration and the potential conflicts of interest such arrangements might 
involve); Egon Franck, Beyond Market Power: Efficiency Explanation for the Basic 
Structures of North American Major League Organizations, 3 EUR. SPORT MGMT. Q. 221, 
227–29, 230–32 (2010) (arguing that cost advantages of single entity league come at high 
price because such a model is at odds with signaling genuine competition among teams); 
Sherwin Rosen & Allen Sanderson, Labor Markets in Professional Sports 4–5 (NBER 
Working Paper 7573, 2000) (suggesting that outcomes might appear to be rigged if teams 
in league were commonly owned and directly coordinated). 
41 Admittedly, when the commissioner rules on these kinds of disputes between other 
teams, he may affect the fortunes of the league-owned franchise.  But there the conflict is 
less pronounced, and dismantling the league’s administrative structure would be an 
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League Baseball with the Commissioner ruling on a matter that 
affected the interests of a team that he owned, apparently no thought 
was given to such a recusal.42   League officials, including the 
commissioner, have a responsibility—whether denominated as a 
fiduciary duty or given some other appellation—to conduct their 
activities for the benefit of the league as a whole.43  To behave in a 
way that provides deferential treatment for a league-owned 
franchise runs counter to that charge.  Indeed, under one reading, a 
plausible argument can be made that moving Chris Paul to the 
Lakers would have benefitted the league as a whole; the NBA’s 
popularity has been historically built not on the participation of 
many teams but on the brilliance of a few, particularly the Lakers 
and Celtics.  Unlike in the NFL, parity has never been a significant 
force in the NBA.44 
The point can be put more broadly—there is an inherent conflict 
between ownership and regulation.  A recent example (in a 
different context) is the situation created by the United States 
                                                                                                             
unnecessary overreaction.  However, recognition of the existence of a conflict even in this 
circumstance underlines that the best treatment of conflicts, to the extent possible, is to 
avoid them. 
42 See infra notes 43–55 and accompanying text. 
43 See generally Professional Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey Ass’n, 143 Cal App. 3d 
410, 415 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that franchise representatives who served on the 
corporate Board of Trustees of nonprofit corporation which operated a major professional 
hockey league had fiduciary duty to act for the benefit of the league as a whole when 
making decisions about common league goals).  Whether sports leagues, in fact, are 
operated for the collective good of the business as a whole has been seriously 
questioned.  Professors Ross and Szymanski have argued that club-run leagues, the typical 
structure of North American professional sports, may be anticompetitive and contrary to 
the public interest and that sporting competitions organized by independent unitary entities 
may be more efficient and beneficial for consumers.  Club-run leagues, they demonstrate, 
suffer from significant operational inefficiencies due to the tendency of these leagues to put 
the interests of individual clubs above the interest of the league as a whole and the presence 
of substantial transaction costs that prevent optimal results. See Stephen F. Ross & Stefan 
Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient Joint Ventures: Why Sports Leagues Should Look 
More Like McDonald’s and Less Like the United Nations, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 213 
(2006). 
44 See Michael Wilbon, Chris Paul Veto: Vindictive and Petty, ESPN (Dec. 9, 2011), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/commentary/story/_/page/wilbon-111209/david-stern-nba-owner
s-look-vindictive-petty-veto-chris-paul-trade (arguing that, unlike the NFL, parity “has 
never amounted to a hill of beans” in the NBA). 
2014] LEAGUE OWNERSHIP OF TEAMS AND CONFLICTS 1009 
government’s major equity interest in General Motors.45  As a 
result of the federal financial rescue plan intended to stabilize 
General Motors and Chrysler, the government emerged as the owner 
of a controlling interest in the companies.46   This condition of 
multiple interests as both owner and regulator has created suspicion 
that the results of safety tests have been distorted or concealed in 
order to support the share price.47  And the conflict is not limited to 
safety issues.  For example, General Motors is subject to executive 
pay restrictions that no private-equity owner would accept because 
they limit its ability to attract and retain management 
talent. 48   League control of a franchise begets similar 
owner–regulator conflicts and generates analogous suspicions.49  
One might initially think that the league owners would regard the 
conflict of interest—and the compromised judgment attending 
it—as inconsequential since each of them owns an equal fractional 
interest in the league-controlled team.  But that is not the case 
because any such decision would affect teams 
differently.  Consider the response to the proposed Chris Paul trade 
itself.  While in a formal sense all the teams will “benefit” equally 
from a decision made to support the league-controlled team, in fact, 
any “benefit” or “harm” will not be experienced equally.50  For 
most owners, the central question about any decision (or proposed 
change of rules) is whether it will place them ahead of their rivals.51  
                                                                                                             
45 See James B. Stewart, Owner as Regulator, Like Oil and Water, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 
2012, at B1 (“The Obama administration . . . has a political agenda that often conflicts with 
ownership interests.  It wants to keep unions happy, promote the environment and lift 
employment, among other goals, which may conflict with maximizing returns to 
taxpayers.”). 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. 
49 See generally Bill King & John Lombardo, League-owned Teams = Headache, 
SPORTS BUS. J. (Feb. 20, 2012), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/
Issues/2012/02/20/Leagues-and-Governing-Bodies/Ownership.aspx (asserting that the 
most prominent problem with league ownership is the “persistent suspicion that the league 
might favor some teams over others when it came time to make a deal”). 
50 As noted previously, the effort by Cavaliers’ owner, Dan Gilbert, to have 
Commissioner Stern exercise his authority with respect to the Hornets to benefit the 
Cavaliers is a prime example of the kind of conflict of interest that inheres in the existing 
structure. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
51 See generally King & Lombardo, supra note 49 (reporting that some of the heads of 
NHL teams were irritated both by the success of a league-owned team and its decision to 
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Ownership of a sports team is mostly about relatives, not 
absolutes.52 
II. BASEBALL’S OWNER-COMMISSIONER: AN EXAMPLE NOT TO BE 
FOLLOWED 
In 1992, following the resignation of Fay Vincent, 53  Allan 
“Bud” Selig, owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, was selected to be 
the acting Commissioner of Major League Baseball.54  Midway 
through the 1998 season, baseball’s owners voted to give Selig the 
commissioner title on a permanent basis.55  Here the presence of a 
                                                                                                             
compete for talent).  More generally, as a league-owned team improves and wins more 
games, other teams will lose more games, potentially decreasing revenues for those team 
owners as result of a decision made in the best interest of the league-owned team.  The 
owners are conflicted in the sense that they are both seeking a quick return on their 
investment in the league-owned franchise but at the same time do not want to risk the 
fortunes of their individual teams.  Thus, they want their own teams to do well but also 
seek the league-owned team to do well enough to increase its value so that they can turn a 
quick profit on that investment. 
52 See Ross & Szymanski, supra note 43, at 233.  This point is related to one reason why 
the traditional club-run structure of the major North American sports leagues prevents 
efficient changes that would enhance fan appeal and overall league 
profitability.  Transaction costs—the inability of owners, acting in the perceived best 
interests of their own teams, to agree on the division of additional profits—hamper the 
ability to take advantage of efficient business opportunities. See id. at 224–25. 
53 See Murray Chass, Vincent, Bowing to Owner’s Will, Resigns as Baseball 
Commissioner, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8 1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/08/
us/vincent-bowing-to-owners-will-resigns-as-baseball-commissioner.html.  Because 
Vincent, invoking the best interests of baseball, had compelled the owners to open spring 
training camps after the March 1990 thirty-two-day lockout, they did not want him around 
to possibly limit their strategic options for the 1993–94 labor negotiations.  Accordingly, 
they forced his resignation in September 1992. 
54 See Claire Smith, Whatever His Title, Selig’s in the Hot Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 
1992, http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/10/sports/on-baseball-whatever-his-title-selig-s-
in-the-hot-seat.html?ref=budselig. 
55 See Murray Chass, Take Away the ‘Acting’ Label: Selig Is Baseball’s Commissioner, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/10/sports/baseball-
take-away-the-acting-label-selig-is-baseball-s-commissioner.html?ref=budselig.  Over 
the years in congressional testimony it was common for baseball owners to assure 
Congress that it need not concern itself with baseball’s unique exemption from the antitrust 
laws nor with any need for outside regulation because the “independent” commissioner 
would act to protect consumers from potential abuses and look after the game’s best 
interests. See, e.g., Allan Selig, Congressional Hearing: Major League Baseball and Its 
Antitrust Exemption, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 277, 278 (1994).  With the appointment of 
Selig, any pretense of independence from the owners was dropped.  The reasonable 
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conflict was evident, and, unsurprisingly, it did not take long for 
incidents that implicated the tension to arise. 
First, exacerbating the conflict, Selig, while acting 
commissioner, continued to receive an executive salary of 
approximately $500,000 a year from the Brewers in addition to his 
generous commissioner’s compensation.56  Further, in 1995 Selig 
secured a $3 million loan for the Brewers from Carl Pohlad, the 
owner of the Minnesota Twins.57  Baseball rule 20(c), though, bars 
intra-team lending, stating that owners may not loan one another 
money without first obtaining permission from the commissioner 
and the other owners.58  The rule is designed to protect against one 
team having unfair influence over another—for example, in 
affecting trades—and its purpose is to avoid even the appearance of 
                                                                                                             
assumption that the best interests of baseball would now be more perfectly aligned with the 
best interests of the owners presumably influenced the thinking of the players’ union as 
well.  Indeed, while our focus is on the league and its members, league takeover of a 
franchise may have significant effects on another institutional actor, the players’ 
representative.  Does league ownership of a team raise distinctive concerns from the 
perspective of a union?  In the case of MLB’s purchase and operation of the Expos, the 
Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) was principally wary of the 
possible facilitation of collusion in the bidding for free agents. 
56 The Brewers did not prosper as a team during the 1990s, and some people suspected 
that it suffered from lack of attention. Michael Megna, for example, a sports-franchise 
appraiser who worked for the Brewers, stated, “Selig was trying to wear too many hats and 
was too ambitious.” See STEFAN SZYMANSKI & ANDREW S. ZIMBALIST, NATIONAL 
PASTIME: HOW AMERICANS PLAY BASEBALL AND THE REST OF THE WORLD PLAYS SOCCER 
127 (2005). 
57 See “It’s Really Horrifying”: Selig’s Brewers Received $3 Million Loan from 
Pohlad’s Firm, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/news/ 
2002/01/08/selig_pohlad_ap? (last updated Jan. 8, 2002, 8:36 PM). 
58 MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL RULES, Rule 20(c) (2012).  The relevant portion of the 
rules state: 
Loans to Clubs and Other Individuals.  No Club, or owner, 
stockholder, officer, director or employee (including manager or 
player) of a Club shall, directly or indirectly, loan money to or become 
surety or guarantor for any Club, officer, employee or umpire of its, his 
or her League, unless all facts of the transaction shall first have been 
fully disclosed to all other Clubs in that League, and also to the 
Commissioner, and the transaction has been approved by them. 
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a conflict of interest.59  Nevertheless, Selig did not seek approval of 
the loan from the other owners.60 
The next episode also involved Selig’s good friend, Carl Pohlad.  
Following the 2001 season MLB moved to dissolve two of its thirty 
teams before the 2002 season began.61  While no formal decision 
had been made as to which two franchises were to be contracted, the 
universal assumption was that the two likely candidates were the 
Montreal Expos and the Minnesota Twins.62  Such a plan would 
have produced a very generous buyout of Pohlad in an amount much 
greater than what he had paid for the team.63  More significantly, 
from a conflict-of-interest perspective, as a result of elimination of 
the Twins, the Brewers would recapture fans in western Wisconsin 
and parts of Minnesota and its television market would expand 
appreciably.64  Contraction of a team from MLB’s thirteenth largest 
media market would enlarge the uncontested reach of the Brewers’ 
market to its west by several hundred miles.65 
                                                                                                             
59 See Bob Nightengale, Selig Stands in Against Lots of High Heat, USA TODAY, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/bbw/2002-01-16/2002-01-16-majors.htm (last 
updated Jan. 15, 2002, 9:41 PM). 
60 That there was any impropriety in the transaction, in fact, is unlikely.  The loan was a 
short-term bridge accommodation at one and a half points above the prime rate and was 
paid off in three months. See id. 
61 Elimination of teams, which proved an abortive exercise in 2001, was a notion largely 
unimagined in the major professional sports leagues in modern times until then. See Scott 
R. Rosner, The History and Business of Contraction in Major League Baseball, 8 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 265, 269 (2003). 
62 Downsizing Owners Vote to Drop Two Clubs, but Don’t Identify Them, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/mlb/news/2001/11/06/ 
contraction_ap (last updated Nov. 7, 2001, 7:38 PM). 
63 See Twins Owner Pohlad, 93, Dies, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/ 
story?id=3812007 (last updated Jan. 6, 2009, 2:03 PM) (reporting on the alleged $150 
million buyout price of the Minnesota Twins); Stuart Lavietes, Carl R. Pohlad, Owner of 
Minnesota Twins, Dies at 93, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, at A17 (Twins bought by Pohlad 
for $44 million). 
64 See Rob Dibble, An Open Letter to Bud Selig, ESPN (Dec. 6, 2001), 
http://espn.go.com/talent/danpatrick/s/2001/1119/1280454.html. 
65 See id. for an instance of contemporary criticism of the proposed contraction as an 
example of compromised decision-making. See also, George Vecsey, Twins Should 
Outlast Selig, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/09/
sports/sports-of-the-times-twins-should-outlast-bud-selig.html (stating that the 
relationship between the Baseball Commissioner and the Twins’ owner is “rotten” and that 
Selig should step aside as commissioner). 
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Finally, the terms and administration of the 2002 collective 
bargaining agreement (CBA) greatly advantaged the Brewers.  That 
CBA introduced a new extensive revenue-sharing system, 
ostensibly put in place to improve competitive balance. 66  
However, if the system was responsible for the achievement of 
greater balance, it would have been because the revenues transferred 
to the bottom teams were being used to increase payroll.  But, in 
fact, that was not the case as there was no payroll rule for teams 
receiving money transfers, 67  and the system’s incentives 
discouraged payroll increases, particularly for low-revenue 
teams.68  The one policy in place to ensure that transfers be spent on 
payroll was an admonition in the CBA to be enforced by the 
commissioner: “[E]ach Club shall use its revenue sharing 
receipts . . . in an effort to improve its performance on the 
field.  The commissioner shall enforce this obligation.”69 
However, at the time of the 2002 CBA, the Brewers were a 
low-revenue team.70  If Selig enforced on other teams the provision 
that teams receiving transfers spend that money in an effort to 
improve on-field performance, he would also have had to apply it to 
the Brewers, thereby raising the Brewers’ payroll.  In fact, “the 
Brewers benefitted more than any other team from the 2002 
                                                                                                             
66 See Paul D. Staudohar, Baseball Negotiations: A New Agreement, MONTHLY LAB. 
REV. 15, 21 (2002). 
67 The absence of a payroll rule contrasts sharply with the arrangement in the NBA 
where the CBA requires a minimum payroll for each team.  There the league’s 
revenue-sharing system establishes a floor as well as a ceiling on each team’s 
payroll.  That minimum amount of spending is close to the cap amount. See Coon, 
Question 15: Is There a Minimum Amount Each Team Must Pay Its Players?, supra note 5.  
This provision manifests the recognition that a requirement that teams that have been 
spending too little on talent spend more is just as necessary to the quality of the game as is 
the requirement that teams that have been over-spending cut back.  Stipulation of a 
minimum payroll can guarantee that smaller-market teams do not free ride from 
large-market revenues by disposing of talented players in favor of cheap, low-quality 
labor. 
68 See Daniel A. Rascher & Timothy D. DeSchriver, Smooth Operators: Recent 
Collective Bargaining in Major League Baseball, 7 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. 176, 202 (2012). 
69 2003–2006 Agreement Between Major League Clubs and the Major League Baseball 
Players Association, art. XXIV, available at http://www.steroidsinbaseball.net/
cba/cba_02_06.pdf. 
70 See Letter from Janice Mueller, State Auditor, State of Wis., to Mary Panzer, Senate 
Majority Leader, State of Wis., and John Gard, Assembly Speaker, State of Wis. (May 6, 
2004), available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/04-Brewers.pdf. 
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CBA.” 71   The club’s revenue-sharing receipts rose from $1.5 
million in 2001 to $9.1 million in 2002 and to $16.35 million in 
2003.72  Despite the CBA’s requirement that the transfers be used to 
improve a team’s performance, the Brewers’ opening-day payroll 
sunk from $52.7 million in 2002 to $40.6 million in 2003 and to 
$27.5 million in 2004, the lowest of baseball’s thirty teams.73  Selig 
had no incentive to enforce the CBA’s mandate on spending 
revenue-sharing receipts and indeed, he did not enforce it. 
Selig might respond that there are different routes to team 
improvement and permitting teams to use revenue-sharing receipts 
for purposes such as reducing debt may ultimately benefit 
performance.  He might add that each team has different needs and 
different approaches for building a winning franchise.  But 
whatever the ambiguity about whether his behavior was 
conflicted—assuming there is an ambiguity—the fundamental point 
is that the appearance of a conflict of interest weakened the 
perception of the integrity of the office.  Indeed, “any initiative by 
him to redistribute the game’s riches [smacked] of a conflict of 
interest.”74 
Selig’s transfer of control of the Brewers to his daughter in 1998 
hardly ameliorated concerns about conflicts of interest, as she is a 
                                                                                                             
71 SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 56, at 181. 
72 See Letter from Janice Mueller to Mary Panzer & John Gard, supra note 70. 
73 See SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 56. 
74 ANDREW ZIMBALIST, The Commissioner’s New Clothes, in THE BOTTOM LINE: 
OBSERVATIONS AND ARGUMENTS ON THE SPORTS BUSINESS 75, 75 (2006).  Another 
troubling episode involved application of MLB’s 60/40 rule: 
[Selig] co-wrote a 1982 rule that required teams to maintain a ratio of 
at least 60 percent equity to at most 40 percent debt, known as the 
60/40 rule.  The Brewers often struggled to comply.  A Wisconsin 
state legislative audit, which covered 1994 to 2003 and was 
occasioned by public displeasure over the Brewers’ taxpayer-financed 
$392 million stadium, found the Brewers didn’t meet the 60/40 
standard in seven of those 10 years.  The audit noted the rule’s 
enforcement was suspended from 1994 to 1998 by the acting 
commissioner, who was also the Brewers’ owner. 
John Helyar & Scott Soshnick, Selig Bends Rules to Fit as Baseball Attempts to Oust 
McCourt from Dodgers, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-10-24/selig-bends-rules-to-fit-as-baseball-attempts-to-oust-mccourt-from-dod
gers.html. 
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close family member.75  Moreover, he placed his shares in the 
Brewers in a “blind trust.”76  A blind trust is an arrangement in 
which a trust beneficiary authorizes trustees to have full discretion 
over his assets.77  The trust beneficiary has no knowledge of the 
trust’s holdings and no authority to intervene in its handling.78  
Typically, a blind trust is employed when a person with multiple 
assets is selected for public office.79  The personal assets are placed 
in a trust, and during the term of the trust the officeholder has no 
idea what transactions are made with respect to those assets.80  
However, in Selig’s case, even though others could vote his shares, 
only one asset was involved and Selig would inevitably know if it 
was sold.  And he surely knew that when he left office the value of 
the team would have been affected by his decisions.  In short, there 
was nothing blind about the arrangement.81 
League commissioners have expansive authority to administer 
league affairs, to provide a fair and impartial forum for resolution of 
interclub controversies, to execute by-laws and constitutional 
provisions neutrally, to distribute money from discretionary funds, 
and to look after the overall interests of the game.82  Having an 
owner occupy the position of commissioner carries implications of 
self-interest in the performance of these functions.  Accordingly, in 
contrast to the MLB, all of the other major North American sports 
leagues have constitutional provisions designed to avoid the 
situation of a compromised commissioner. 83   These provisions 
stipulate that the commissioner cannot own a team, or a piece of a 
                                                                                                             
75 See Thomas Boswell, After All the Wrongs, Selig Could Be Mr. Right, WASHINGTON 
POST, July 10, 1998, at C1; see also Bud Selig, NNDB, http://www.nndb.com/
people/226/000025151 (last visited Dec. 24, 2013) (“Selig’s impartiality as Commissioner 
was questioned, but not nearly enough.  Putting an owner in charge of baseball’s integrity 
was like asking a team’s catcher—instead of an umpire—to call balls-and-strikes.”). 
76 See Helyar & Soshnick, supra note 74. 
77 See Wendy S. Goffe, An Introduction to Lesser-Known but Useful Trusts–Part 2, 37 
EST. PLAN. 3, 8–9 (2010). 
78 See id. 
79 See id. at 6. 
80 See id. 
81 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 74, at 178. 
82 See Major League Baseball Players’ Association, 2012–2016 Basic Agreement art. 
XXIV; MAJOR LEAGUE CONST., art. II. 
83 See, e.g., NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION CONST. § 24(b); NATIONAL FOOTBALL 
LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, § 8.3; CONST. art. VI, § 6.2. 
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team, in his own league or in any other league.84  Thus, the NBA, 
NFL, and NHL constitutions state: “the commissioner shall have no 
financial interest, direct or indirect, in any professional sport.”85 
III. POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO THE CONFLICTS PROBLEM 
While the existence and intensity of conflict are more apparent 
when the commissioner personally owns a team, a similar 
multiplicity of interests and roles occurs when a league, headed by a 
commissioner, owns a team.  The difference in the two situations is 
one of degree.  The question, then, is how the league might 
responsibly deal with the conflicts produced by league ownership of 
a franchise. 
As noted previously, there are numerous instances in which the 
NBA commissioner might be called on to exercise his authority in 
matters involving the league-owned team.  Thus, under the NBA 
Constitution and By-Laws, the commissioner has “full, complete 
and final jurisdiction of any dispute involving two (2) or more 
Members of the Association”; the power to “interpret . . . the 
provisions of the Constitution”; and the “power to declare null and 
void any Player transaction made by and between Members of the 
Association or by and between Members of the Association and any 
organization outside of the Association.”86  In a case where the 
commissioner is called on to adjudicate a dispute between parties 
one of which is the league-owned franchise, an appropriate response 
would be to refer the matter to an independent arbitrator.  The 
parties should be given a voice in identifying that decision-maker, 
whether by authorizing them to agree on the person or by providing 
them a veto over the commissioner’s choice(s). 
Assignment of the matter to a designee of the commissioner87 in 
the NBA office would be an inadequate move, as the designee 
                                                                                                             
84 See, e.g., id. 
85 See, e.g., id. 
86 NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION CONST. §§ 24(d), (h), (i). 
87 In the case of disciplinary matters, it is not uncommon for the collective bargaining 
agreement to provide that an appeal from a commissioner’s disciplinary ruling will be 
heard by the commissioner or his designee. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement 
Between NFL Management Council and NFL Players Association, art. 46, § 2(a) (2011); 
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would be aware of the interests of the league-owned disputant and 
would be similarly tainted.  The relatively small number of 
executives in the NBA office also argues against the advisability of 
a designation.  Here, there is an analogue to the negative judicial 
reaction to law-firm efforts to employ a “screen” or “wall” to deal 
with the conflicts that arise when lawyers change firms when the 
new firm is small.88  In a firm where lawyers regularly interact with 
each other, there is a heightened possibility that inadvertent 
disclosures of confidences and secrets gained through the 
disqualified lawyer’s prior representation will occur.  In that 
setting, the assumption that any confidential information that one 
member of a firm has is accessible to other members of the firm and 
that any conflict of interest that affects a member of the firm will 
also affect other members has credibility.89 
The idea that a sports-league commissioner should decline 
participation due to a conflict of interest when called upon to 
adjudicate a particular dispute is not as radical a notion as it might 
first appear.  For example, in 1972 Julius Erving brought an action 
to set aside his contract with the Virginia Squires of the American 
                                                                                                             
Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National Basketball Association and NBA 
Players Association, art. XXXI, §§ 7(a), 8(a) (2005). 
88 See, e.g., Decora, Inc. v. DW Wallcovering, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct recognize a principle of “imputed” 
disqualification. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a).  Under this notion, if 
lawyers are associated in a firm and one of the lawyers—who has moved from another 
firm—is disqualified from handling a matter, that disqualification is imputed to bar all 
members of the firm.  One mechanism firms have employed in an effort to avoid this result 
is to screen the disqualified lawyer from any involvement in the matter.  Screening 
involves preventing the disqualified lawyer from securing profits from the matter that 
created the conflict, limiting his access to the files of the matter that created his 
disqualification, and restricting communications between him and the other lawyers in the 
firm working on the matter that created the conflict.  Courts may well evidence more 
receptivity to this approach in light of the ABA adoption in 2009 of a new version of Rule 
1.10(a) that permits timely screening as a way to avoid imputed disqualification as long as 
notice requirements are met. See, e.g., Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Technologies, Inc., 
741 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (W.D. Wis. 2010). 
89 See Devika Kewalramani, Ethical Walls: Building the Electronic Barrier, 84 N.Y. ST. 
B.J. 30, 32 (2012) (noting that courts are more skeptical of the adequacy of the screening 
procedure when the firm is smaller). See generally Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense to 
Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA L. REV. 677, 708, n.146 (1980) (claiming that if 
bank or firm is small so that same employees perform diverse functions, it may be 
impossible to build a wall). 
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Basketball Association (ABA) for fraud. 90   The court ordered 
arbitration of the claims as required by the contract.91  However, 
although the contract provided for arbitration by the league 
commissioner, the court ordered the substitution of a neutral 
arbitrator because the ABA Commissioner, Robert S. Carlson, was a 
partner in the law firm that represented Erving’s employer, the 
Squires.92  The conflict of interest in the Erving situation is quite 
similar to what would occur if the NBA Commissioner was called 
on to rule in a dispute involving two teams, or a team and a player, 
one of which was the league-owned franchise.93  In both Erving 
and our hypothetical, the appointment of an independent 
decision-maker is necessary to ensure a fair and impartial hearing.94  
Disclosure of the conflict would be an inadequate response, as the 
parties are already aware of the conflict and therefore prevention of 
deception is not at stake.95 
While recusal and substitution of an independent 
decision-maker is a feasible and apt response in the case of a 
narrow, highly focused dispute, such as that in the Erving case, the 
ongoing, pervasive conflicts inherent in operation of a franchise, 
exemplified by personnel decisions involving Chris Paul, require a 
correspondingly more comprehensive arrangement.  An analogue 
is the institution of the independent receiver.  To the extent 
possible, the need is to construct an arrangement guaranteeing 
operational independence that will assure fans of team autonomy, 
                                                                                                             
90 See Erving v. Va. Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972). 
91 See id. at 1069. 
92 See id. at 1067; see also Morris v. N.Y. Football Giants, Inc., 575 N.Y.S.2d 1013 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that a neutral arbitrator should be substituted for the NFL 
Commissioner in order to insure an impartial hearing in a compensation dispute between 
professional football players and their former teams). But see generally National Hockey 
League Players’ Ass’n v. Bettman, No. 93 Civ. 5769 (KMW), 1994 WL 738835, at *44 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1994) (refusing to vacate award by league commissioner for “evident 
partiality” when collective bargaining agreement assigned the kind of dispute solely to the 
league president/commissioner for resolution). 
93 One difference between the two situations is that the NBA Commissioner would not 
stand to receive a personal benefit from his ruling. 
94 See generally Davis, supra note 35, at 13 (noting that one possible response to conflict 
is escape and one way to escape a conflict of interest is to redefine the underlining 
relationship such as a recusal by a prosecutor). 
95 Disclosure, unlike escape, as a response to a conflict of interest does not terminate the 
conflict.  “[I]t merely avoids betrayal of trust, opening the way for other responses.” Id. 
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that is, that the team will function no differently from other 
franchises with respect to its relationship to the league.  
Construction and maintenance of a suitable structure is likely to be 
complicated by the fact that the other league members are both 
fractional owners of and competitors with the league-owned 
franchise. 
The need for a prophylactic barrier to separate two parts of an 
organization to prevent conflicts arises in a number of settings other 
than sports.  Often referred to metaphorically as a “Chinese 
wall,”96 the segregation is designed to limit communication in order 
to manage conflicts of interest and to prevent the movement of 
confidential information.  In journalism, for example, there is a 
screen between the newspaper’s newsroom and the business 
(advertising) department.97  The objective is to have news coverage 
decisions made uninfluenced by knowledge of who is advertising 
(or might advertise) with the newspaper and what those advertisers 
want. 98   Similarly, in a multi-function financial institution, 
typically a barrier is put in place to separate those giving corporate 
advice on takeovers from those advising clients about buying 
shares.99   Here the aim is to prevent leaks of corporate inside 
information, which could influence the advice given to clients 
making investments and allow staff to take advantage of facts that 
are not yet known to the general public. 100   The policies and 
procedures are designed to stop the passage of price-sensitive 
information across two divisions of a firm.101  And in the legal 
                                                                                                             
96 See Christopher M. Gorman, Note, Are Chinese Walls the Best Solution to the 
Problems of Insider Trading and Conflicts of Interest in Broker-Dealers, 9 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 475 (2004). 
97 See David Segal, Chinese Walls, Pocked With Peepholes, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2010, 
at WK2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/weekinreview/13segal.html. 
98 See id. 
99 See Gorman, supra note 96, at 482. 
100 When firms provide a wide range of services, clients must be able to trust that 
information about themselves will not be exploited for the benefit of clients with different 
interests.  Accordingly, clients must be able to believe in the effectiveness of Chinese 
walls. See id. at 483. 
101 Similarly, research and investment banking units are separated so that analysts are not 
tempted to provide biased research reports in response to pressure from the investment 
bankers.  The objective of the arrangement is to maintain analysts’ independence by 
eliminating, or at least reducing, the conflict between the interests of the investment 
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profession, when a lawyer moves from one firm to another, a 
screen—whereby communication is restricted between the lawyer 
who has moved and the other lawyers in the firm working on the 
matter that created a conflict—is sometimes employed in an effort 
to prevent “imputed” disqualification of the second firm.102 
However, in defending his actions in the Chris Paul affair, David 
Stern observed accurately that no superstar is traded in the NBA 
unless the owner gives his approval.103  The challenge, then, is to 
create—within the overall framework of autonomy—a mechanism 
for handling trades that takes account of both this legitimate 
ownership interest and the presence of the conflict of interest.  A 
procedure that would provide adequate distance would be to 
designate a retired, respected, former NBA executive to evaluate 
proposed trades by the league-owned team—someone with no 
current ties to basketball but with a background of credible 
expertise.  The expert would have no axe to grind nor would he 
hold any lingering grudges against any of the other teams in the 
leagues.104 
The difficulty in creating the necessary operational autonomy 
lies not just in its design but also in its implementation.105  After all, 
the separation arrangement is self-policing; it relies on the 
discretion and meticulousness of the parties involved.  
Accordingly, even if it accomplishes some filtering, it can often be 
                                                                                                             
banking unit and those of the investors who rely on analysts’ recommendations. See id. at 
499. 
102 See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
103 See John Cherwa, Commissioner Tries to Keep Kings in Sacramento, L.A. TIMES, 
February 25, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/25/sports/la-sp-nba-stars-2012
0226. 
104 This approach is not unusual.  In other industries, parties avoid conflicts by seeking 
individuals with “independent judgment in situations in which their own judgment is 
compromised.”  In the financial services industry, for example, independent persons 
include “independent appraisers in determining the value of assets in cases of self-dealing, 
independent actuaries in the operation of corporate pension funds, and independent proxy 
advisory services in deciding how to vote shares held by trusts and funds.” See John R. 
Boatright, Financial Services, in CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 
35, at 235. 
105 See generally Bolkiah v. KPMG, [1998] EWHC (Ch.) 1 (Eng.) (noting that while 
Chinese walls are “well adapted to deal with foreseeable or deliberate disclosure of 
information, they are not well adapted to deal with disclosure that is accidental, 
inadvertent, or negligent”). 
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circumvented informally without much effort.  Recent financial 
scandals involving breach of the relevant walls raise serious doubts 
about the general efficacy of this kind of compartmentalization 
arrangement.106  The evidence, at least from this industry, indicates 
the porousness of Chinese walls.  The literature on the subject 
supports skepticism about achievement of the intended 
objective. 107   Clearly, effectiveness requires prompt 
implementation,108 embraced by upper management and vigilant 
enforcement.109  And an arrangement with physical and structural 
separation is most likely to be effective. 
How likely is it that a league and its owners will be willing to 
commit to the necessary separation and attendant 
arrangements?  Leadership from the top is critical to 
effectiveness.  The fact is that the NBA, at least, showed clear 
awareness of the conflicts issue in fashioning the autonomy of the 
                                                                                                             
106 See Lisa Smith, How Effective Is the Chinese Wall?, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 22, 2013), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/102213/how-effective-chinese-wall.asp. 
107 See, e.g., H. Nejat Seyhun, Insider Trading and the Effectiveness of Chinese Walls in 
Securities Firms, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 369, 371 (2008) (suggesting that Chinese Walls are 
porous and ineffective); see Gorman, supra note 96, at 476, 490–91 (arguing that “Chinese 
walls . . . are inefficient, largely ineffective, and have more shortcomings than advantages” 
and they do more to prevent the “accidental flow of inside information” than they do to 
prevent disclosure due to “purposeful misconduct and conspiracies”); see also Lee Aitken, 
“Chinese Walls” and Conflicts of Interest, 18 MONASH U. L. REV. 91, 93 (1992) 
(suggesting that in context of law firms there is good ground for judicial reluctance to trust 
to the impermeability of a “wall” as a method of preserving confidence and avoiding 
conflict); Comment, supra note 89, at 708 (arguing that large amounts of money in 
transactions may present temptations too great to resist; structural, procedural, and 
educational methods may be no match for natural tendency of co-workers to talk shop at 
company-wide social gatherings or in chance encounters). 
108 In the case of law-firm conflicts, courts have considered the timeliness of erection of 
the screen when considering the effectiveness of the screening procedure. See, e.g., 
Chinese Automobile Distribs. of America v. Bricklin, No. 07 civ. 4113(LLS), 2009 WL 
47337 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2009); Kewalramani, supra note 89, at 31. 
109 In the financial sector, Chinese walls are partly unsuccessful because of the absence 
of strong incentives for broker-dealers to establish and supervise compliance with 
them. See Gorman, supra note 96, at 493.  One drawback of the firewall approach is that it 
eliminates “some of the gains from integrating different functions in one firm, and firms 
may lose the confidence of customers, who fear, for example, that investment advice does 
not represent all the information possessed by a firm.” See Boatright, supra note 104, at 
235.  This concern, however, does not apply to the NBA situation. 
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Hornets’ management.110  The problem was that, in the end, the 
commissioner failed to respect this autonomy.111 
The difficulty in defining the autonomy of management in a 
setting where the league-owned franchise is a competitor with the 
other league members is illustrated by the task of setting the budget 
for the franchise.  To some extent this decision is limited by the 
provision in the NBA collective bargaining agreement that requires 
a minimum payroll expenditure by each team. 112   MLB’s 
experience with the Expos, in a collective-bargaining framework 
without a required team payroll floor, though, offers a stark example 
of the muddle that can result.  Baseball’s owners regularly placed 
budgetary (and other) limits on the Expos in order to weaken the 
Expos as an on-field competitor.  For example, in September 2003, 
with the Expos in the race for a playoff spot, the team looked to 
execute the standard late-season call-up of minor league 
players.  But the owners would not approve the additional $50,000 
that it would have cost to do so.113  Similarly, at the end of the 2003 
                                                                                                             
110 The required leadership is unlikely to emerge in the MLB in light of its inattention to 
conflicts issues over time. See supra notes 53–81 and accompanying text. 
111 According to one well-known commentator, Stern’s intervention in the Chris Paul 
trade was his greatest failure as commissioner. See David Stern, the Highs and Lows, 
ESPN (Oct. 26, 2012), http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/page/5-on-5-121026/nba-david-
stern-impact-legacy-road-ahead (comment by Larry Coon). 
112 See supra note 67.  For the 2012–13 season, the minimum team payroll is 85% of the 
salary cap ($49.337 million).  If a team does not meet its minimum payroll, it is charged at 
the end of the season for the shortfall, and that money is distributed among the players on 
that team. See also Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National Hockey League 
and National Hockey League Players’ Association, art. 50 (2012-2022) (showing team 
payroll range, lower limit and upper limit), available at 
http://www.nhlpa.com/inside-nhlpa/collective-bargaining-agreement. 
113 See, e.g., Les Carpenter, Minaya Laid Foundation for Success, WASH. POST, July 4, 
2005, http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/03/AR20050703011
06.html.  MLB’s oppositional behavior in 2003 stood in sharp contrast to the league’s 
handling of the Expos in the prior year.  Then it appeared that Tony Tavares, President of 
the Expos, and General Manager Omar Minaya had full authority to run the team and 
Minaya had authority to execute trades.  Indeed, Minaya’s signature move, the acquisition 
of Bartolo Colon, came as a surprise to everyone in the league, suggesting that the 
commissioner was unaware of the negotiations and completed deal. See Jonathan 
Leshanski, Expos-ing the True Story, ATHOMEPLATE (Apr. 26, 2004), 
http://old.athomeplate.com/montrealpt1.shtml; Blockbuster Deal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/news/2002/06/27/indians_expos_trade_ap (last 
updated June 28, 2002).  The trade, though, ignited a negative reaction among the owners, 
who viewed themselves as both subsidizing and in competition with the Expos. 
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season, Vladimir Guerrero, the Expos’ star player, was the premier 
offensive player on the free-agent market.  Rather than let the 
Expos keep its best player, the owners shrunk the Expos’ budget so 
that the team’s general manager was able to make only a token offer 
to keep Guerrero.114 
The absence of an institutionalized structural acknowledgment 
of the conflict issue in the NBA and other leagues115 is likely due, in 
part, to the rareness of league ownership of a team and of the 
presence of situations during such ownership that highlight the 
conflict.  Presumably, David Stern had in mind this infrequency 
when he (wrongly) disclaimed the existence of a conflict of interest 
in his role in the trade decision and referred to the incident as a 
“frozen moment in time.”116  Of course, the behavior of leagues 
                                                                                                             
114 See, e.g., Jonah Keri, Building the 2004 Expos, ESPN (Dec. 8, 2003), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?id=1681258.  MLB’s unappealing handling 
of the Expos’ operations points to an efficiency difficulty, in addition to the conflict of 
interest issues.  That difficulty is the increased transaction costs incurred when other 
league members wish to have input on any significant decision about the operation of the 
league-owned team.  The NBA showed an awareness of this problem in the case of the 
Hornets in that it was decided by various committees and the Board of Governors that the 
league office would make the decision on what was good for the Hornets. See Chris Fedor, 
David Stern Says That Once the Season Starts, Everyone Will Forget About That Silly 
Little Chris Paul Trade Veto, DEADSPIN (Dec. 21, 2011, 10:25 PM), http://
deadspin.com/5870206/david-stern-says-that-once-the-season-starts-everyone-will-forget
-about-that-silly-little-chris-paul-trade-veto. 
115 With respect to the NHL and the Phoenix Coyotes, it appears that no formal measures 
were put in place designed to prevent or mitigate conflicts of interest and guarantee 
autonomy in the operation of the team.  However, the league was concerned about 
continuity of administration and deliberately maintained the existing General Manager, 
Don Maloney, in that position.  No visible, publicized conflicts occurred.  In any case, the 
league’s focus was on stabilizing the team’s finances as the team was losing large amounts 
of money due to an unsatisfactory venue agreement.  And whatever the walling off with 
respect to day-to-day management, Commissioner Gary Bettman was intimately involved 
in the negotiations with the city of Glendale about restructuring the arena lease.  More 
precisely, before each season the league provided Maloney with a set budget for the 
season.  Maloney could spend an amount between that number and the salary-cap 
floor.  With respect to trades, the team employed a dollar-for-dollar system under which 
all trades had to even out monetarily.  Trades involving additional salary required league 
approval.  These arrangements permitted the team to operate somewhat independently of 
the league.  Former players, however, have said that they thought the league was dictating 
to the team about appropriate contract length and funds. See E-mail from Jaime Eisner, 
Assoc. Ed., Five for Howling Blog, to Lewis Kurlantzick (Jan. 29, 2013, 04:46 PM) (on 
file with author).  
116 See Feigen, supra note 19. 
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might also reflect a misjudgment about how much the conflict might 
affect their commissioners’ judgment; and, indeed, people with a 
conflict often credit too highly their own reliability.117  In addition, 
when leagues have assumed ownership of a franchise, undoubtedly 
the intention was to quickly identify a new owner and arrange for a 
transfer of the ownership.118  However, intention and eventuality 
have dramatically diverged.  Thus, MLB ran the Expos/Nationals 
for four and a half years.119  The NHL has owned the Coyotes for 
over three years.120  And the NBA wound up owning the Hornets 
for a year and a half.121 
IV. POSTSCRIPT 
Commissioner Stern remarked at the time that the confusion that 
attended his handling of the proposed trade of Chris Paul to the 
Lakers was due to the media’s failure to distinguish between action 
by him in his role as CEO of the Hornets and action by him in his 
                                                                                                             
117 See Davis, supra note 35, at 11. 
118 For example, when MLB acquired the Montreal Expos in February 2002, it agreed to 
a one-year stadium lease with an option for a second year, evidence that the owners had no 
intention of keeping the team in Montreal for the long term.  In fact, the Expos remained in 
Montreal under MLB ownership for three years.  This intention creates problems for team 
management in that a long-term operational plan is not put in place.  Team executives 
cannot make decisions based on the kind of long-term strategic plan of a team that projects 
its payroll cycle out for three or five years.  Also, often the best way to produce a 
short-term profit is to reduce costs, whereas long-term profit may be more sustainable by 
investing in the team’s operations.  Since the other owners are likely to care only about the 
short term, those in charge of the league-owned franchise may be led to cut costs. See 
Russell Scibetti, What Happens When a League Becomes the Team Owner?, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/leagues-as-team-owners
-and-operators-2011-4.  Moreover, business partners and fans are unlikely to fully 
embrace a franchise as long as its future is uncertain; and league management equals future 
uncertainty. See King & Lombardo, supra note 49. 
119 See Joe Lapointe, One Last Goodbye in Montreal for Expos, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 
2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/29/sports/baseball/29expos.html. 
120 See Nicholas J. Cotsonika, New Coyotes Ownership Supremely Confident in 
Franchise’s Future Successes in Phoenix, YAHOO! SPORTS (Oct. 7, 2013, 4:29 PM), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/nhl—new-coyotes-owners-supremely-confident-of-franchis
e-s-future-successes-in-phoenix-202912214.html. 
121 See New Orleans Hornets’ Sale Completed, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/ 
id/8058469/sale-new-orleans-hornets-new-orleans-saints-owner-tom-benson-complete 
(last updated June 15, 2012, 7:27 PM). 
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role as guardian of the league’s collective interests.122  Consider the 
following. 
Widget manufacturers form a national trade association and 
select a person to serve as Widget Czar.  The Czar is given authority 
to regulate transactions “in the best interests of the widget industry.”  
Among other actions, the Czar has ruled that widget manufacturer C 
cannot buy some of the principal assets of manufacturer D.  The 
Czar speaks in terms of “ruinous competition” and manufacturing 
“balance.”   This arrangement and the Czar’s ruling would 
strike one as not only unusual but as illegal as a violation of the 
Sherman Act.  The ruling runs counter to the economic interest in 
resource mobility.  Subject to a concern about a monopoly, there is 
a social value in resources moving to their most highly valued use.  
Moreover, the reference to “ruinous competition” seems to 
erroneously presuppose that a business has a right to continued 
existence, whereas, in fact, it is for the market to make that 
assessment.  There is no reason to mourn the demise of a company 
that offers a lousy product or service.  And there is no efficiency 
interest served by a balanced widget industry.123 
Yet professional sports leagues have been known to take action 
to ban, or inhibit, the transfer of assets between teams.  A 
well-known example is the prohibition on significant cash sales of 
players.  This restriction precipitated the confrontation in Major 
League Baseball between Charley Finley, the owner of the Oakland 
Athletics, and Commissioner Bowie Kuhn.  Kuhn voided, as not in 
the best interests of baseball, Finley’s cash sale of three of his best 
players to the Boston Red Sox and New York Yankees.  Finley 
responded with a lawsuit, arguing unsuccessfully that Kuhn had 
exceeded his authority.124  Similarly, the present NBA CBA limits 
the amount of cash a team can pay or receive each season to a 
                                                                                                             
122 See Mitchell, supra note 16 (quoting David Stern’s statement that the Hornets were 
“better served with Chris [Paul] in a Hornets uniform than by the outcome of the terms of 
that trade”). 
123 Also, one principle of our contract law is that courts generally do not second-guess the 
terms of a deal.  It is for the parties to fashion the bargain. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981). 
124 Finley v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1978). 
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“maximum annual cash limit.”125  This kind of restriction on asset 
transfers is rooted in the interdependence of members of a league.126  
The fortunes of one team affect the fortunes of the others.  At the 
most basic level, a team needs other teams to play against.  Other 
competitors are required to produce a competition.  For example, 
unlike in the widget industry, where one manufacturer is 
uninterested in the bankruptcy of another, there is a collective 
interest in the financial stability of league members. 
A more conspicuous, ongoing example of restriction on 
management authority to control a team’s assets is the NBA’s 
so-called Stepien Rule.  Named after Ted Stepien, the one-time 
owner of the Cleveland Cavaliers who gained notoriety for his 
troubling pattern of trading draft picks,127 the rule prohibits a team 
from trading its first-round draft pick in consecutive years.128 
                                                                                                             
125 See Coon, Question 94: When Can a Team Trade a Free Agent It Signs? Do They 
Have to Keep Him Forever?, supra note 5.  There are two separate ceilings, one aimed at 
the cash a team pays as part of trades each season, and the other at cash a team receives as 
part of trades each seasons.  The NHL prohibition is more restrictive. See Collective 
Bargaining Agreement Between National Hockey League and National Hockey League 
Players’ Association, arts. 11.16, 50.9(e) (2005) (“There shall be no cash transactions in 
connection with the Assignment of Players.”). 
126 That these restrictions on cash transfers in fact serve the collective interest is hardly as 
clear as might be supposed. Compare Professor Daly, supra note 40, at 18 (viewing the 
limitations as necessary to preserve public confidence in the integrity of competition on the 
playing field), with Rodney Fort & James Quirk, Cross-subsidization, Incentives, and 
Outcomes in Professional Team Sports Leagues, 33 J. ECON. LIT. 1265, 1282–83 (1995) 
(discussing how prior to Kuhn’s intervention there was a long history of cash sales in all 
sports leagues, so it is curious why cash sales would raise issues about integrity only in the 
mid-1970s and not earlier).  More fundamentally, Professor Ross has argued persuasively 
that cash transactions can potentially benefit the less financially secure teams and facilitate 
more efficient allocation of players, thereby serving the collective league interest. See 
Stephen F. Ross, Light, Less-Filling, It’s Blue-Ribbon, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1675, 
1692–96 (2002).  For a similar criticism of the 2005 NHL CBA’s prohibition of the 
inclusion of cash as a trade asset, see Allow NHL Teams to Trade Cash, THE OFFER SHEET 
(July 24, 2012), http://theoffersheet.com/2012/07/24/allow-nhl-teams-to-trade-cash. 
127 Stepien owned the Cavaliers from 1980 to 1983.  He made a habit of trading future 
draft choices for mediocre players and compiled a record of 66–180 during his 
tenure.  Concerned about the devaluation of the franchise, in 1981 Commissioner Larry 
O’Brien informed the Cavaliers that for a period of time the team had to receive league 
approval before making any trades. See Thomas Rogers, NBA to Take Role in Cavaliers’ 
Trades, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1981, at A21. 
128 See Charlie Zegers, What Is the Ted Stepien Rule, ABOUT, http://basketball.
about.com/od/collegebasketballglossary/g/ted-stepien-rule.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2014) 
(defining the rule). 
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In 2008, Gregg Popovich, the head coach of the San Antonio 
Spurs, outraged by what he viewed as a one-sided transaction that 
sent Pau Gasol from the Memphis Grizzlies to the Los Angeles 
Lakers, proclaimed: 
What they did in Memphis is beyond comprehension 
. . . . There should be a trade committee that can 
scratch all trades that make no sense.  I just wish I 
had been on a trade committee that oversees NBA 
trades.  I’d like to elect myself to that committee, I 
would have voted no to the L.A. trade.129 
Though Popovich’s proposal appears facetious, his 
reaction—and the attendant restriction on franchise operation—is 
grounded in the interdependence of teams that we have noted. 
Action with respect to the disposition of assets is, in fact, a 
reflection of a broader league interest in the competent stewardship 
of teams.  A team with no hope of success harms local fans and the 
overall attractiveness of the sport.  In light of interdependence it 
makes sense for a league to hold each owner accountable for the 
management of his franchise.  However, in a club-run league with 
the clubs enjoying perpetual monopoly status, the usual market 
mechanisms that would protect fans are unavailable,130 and it is 
striking that team owners rarely hold a fellow owner accountable for 
the poor stewardship of a team.131  The history of the Los Angeles 
Clippers under the ownership of Donald Sterling provides the stark 
example of sustained mismanagement and unaccountability.132 
                                                                                                             
129 Chris Mannix, Gasol Trade Sparks War of Words: Popovich Pops off on Grizzlies’ 
Controversial Swap, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/ 
basketball/nba/02/08/popovich.grizzlies/index.html (last updated Feb. 9, 2008, 12:00 PM). 
130 In most other industries where companies have considerable market power and are 
publicly traded, inefficiently run corporations are subject to hostile takeovers by those who 
think the company’s value would increase with new management.  Most sports teams, 
though, are not publicly traded corporations.  As a result, there is no market means to 
replace an incompetent owner. See Greg Madison, How to Invest in Sports Teams—and 
Profit, MONEY MORNING (June 3, 2013), http://moneymorning.com/2013/
06/03/how-to-invest-in-sports-teams-and-profit/#. 
131 The NBA’s action with respect to Ted Stepien might be viewed as a minor example to 
the contrary, though it does not rise to an instance of league discipline of an owner for 
mismanagement. See supra notes 127–128 and accompanying text. 
132 See Richard Hoffer, The Loss Generation, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 17, 2000, 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1018959/index.htm (stating 
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that chronic incompetence and virtually uninterrupted ineptitude led to the resulted in the 
Clippers becoming the “losingest team in history”).  As noted previously, Professors Ross 
and Szymanski have argued that the interests of consumers—including a lack of tolerance 
for inept management—would be better served if sporting competitions were organized by 
an independent unitary entity rather than by a club-run league. See supra note 43 and 
accompanying text. 
